Abstract: In a broad class of locally linearizable dynamic stochastic rational-expectations models, I consider various alternative observation sets for the policy maker, each of them made of the history of some endogenous variables or exogenous shocks until some current or past date. For each observation set, I characterize, within the set of feasible paths (paths that can be obtained as one local equilibrium under a policy-instrument rule consistent with this observation set), the subset of implementable paths (paths that can be obtained, in a minimally robust way, as the unique local equilibrium under such a rule). In two applications, I show that, for relevant observation sets, optimal feasible monetary policy may not be implementable in the basic New Keynesian model, even when the number of observed variables largely exceeds the number of unobserved shocks; while debt-stabilizing feasible tax policy is, contrary to conventional wisdom, implementable in the standard real-business-cycle model, even in the presence of policy-implementation lags of any length.
by construction, consistent with her observation set, in the sense that the policy instrument can be expressed on this path as a function of only elements of that set. But we hardly know anything about the conditions − on the model, the policy instrument, the observation set, and the path itself − under which this path can be obtained as the unique local equilibrium under a policy-instrument rule consistent with that set.
Main Contribution. The main contribution of this paper is essentially to characterize these conditions in a general framework and to apply these general results to two specific contexts of interest. More precisely, in my general analysis, I consider a broad class of models, which includes in particular most existing DSGE models. In this class of models, I consider various alternative observation sets for the policy maker, each of them made of the history of some endogenous variables or exogenous shocks until some current or past date. For each observation set, I say that a local path for the endogenous variables is feasible (respectively implementable) when there exists a rule expressing the policy instrument as a function of only elements of the observation set and such that this path is one (respectively the unique, in a minimally robust way) local equilibrium under that rule. 2 The minimal-robustness requirement that I impose for implementability is that the addition of an exogenous policy shock of arbitrarily small variance to the policy-instrument rule in question (capturing, e.g., the policy maker's "trembling hand" or her round-off errors on the elements of the observation set) should still result in a unique local equilibrium, arbitrarily close to the path considered, rather than no local equilibrium at all. The twofold contribution of the paper can then be re-stated as follows. First, I characterize the subset of implementable paths, within the set of feasible paths, for each of these observation sets, in that broad class of models. Second, with two applications, I show that feasible-path (non-)implementability may be an issue in textbook models, for standard policy instruments, relevant observation sets, and interesting feasible paths. One application is about optimal monetary policy in the basic New Keynesian model, the other about debtstabilizing tax policy in the standard real-business-cycle (RBC) model. The results obtained in these applications have important implications about the usefulness for central banks to track key unobserved exogenous rates of interest, the desirability of using labor-income or income taxes to stabilize public debt, and the choice of a benchmark path in normative analyses of stabilization policy.
General Analysis. Some results previously obtained in the literature can be interpreted as results about feasible-path implementability. Probably the main and best known of them is that no feasible path may be implementable when the policy maker observes only exogenous shocks, as rules expressing the policy instrument as a function of only exogenous shocks may lead to local-equilibrium multiplicity. This result was first obtained by Sargent and Wallace (1975) in the context of an ad hoc model of the monetary transmission mechanism. Today, it typically obtains in DSGE models when the policy instrument is the interest rate. However, the case in which the policy maker observes only exogenous shocks seems very restrictive. In most circumstances, she is more relevantly assumed to observe some − if not most − endogenous variables. Now, it is typically by making the policy instrument react out of equilibrium to endogenous variables that she can ensure local-equilibrium determinacy, as first shown by McCallum (1981) . So which feasible paths are implementable when the policy maker observes some endogenous variables? May some feasible paths not be implementable only because they do not satisfy the minimalrobustness requirement for implementability? Are all feasible paths necessarily implementable when the number of observed endogenous variables exceeds the number of unobserved exogenous shocks? What if the policy maker observes endogenous variables with some lags, either because she plays before the private sector within each period (as in, e.g., Svensson and Woodford, 2005) , or because of macroeconomic-data publication lags (as emphasized by, e.g., McCallum, 1999)? Or, equivalently, if policy-implementation lags compel her to set unconditionally in advance the policy instrument (as in, e.g., Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 1997)? These are the questions that I seek to answer in my general analysis.
Consider a broad class of locally linearizable dynamic stochastic discrete-time infinite-horizon rationalexpectations models. Start with the benchmark (though admittedly restrictive) case in which the policy maker observes all exogenous shocks, in addition to some endogenous variables. 3 I show that, in this case, all feasible paths are implementable, however long the lag with which the endogenous variables are observed. So, although they put the policy maker behind the curve by preventing her from reacting out of equilibrium to current or recent endogenous variables, observation lags − or, equivalently, policyimplementation lags − are irrelevant for feasible-path implementability in this case. Now turn to the case in which some shocks are unobserved, but all the unobserved shocks can be inferred from the observed variables and shocks using only the structural equations (as, e.g., a productivity shock can be inferred from the observed input and output levels using only the production function). Then, all feasible paths remain implementable, even in the presence of observation or policy-implementation lags of any length.
The reason is that using the structural equations to replace, in a policy-instrument rule, these unobserved shocks by functions of observed variables and shocks is neutral for robust local-equilibrium determinacy.
Finally, consider the case in which at least one unobserved shock cannot be inferred from the observed variables and shocks using only the structural equations (as, e.g., a discount-factor shock when the private sector's expectations are not observed). In this last case, there may exist some feasible paths that are not implementable, either because they cannot be obtained as the unique local equilibrium under a policy-instrument rule consistent with the observation set considered, or because they cannot be obtained as such in the minimally robust way required for implementability. 4 This non-implementability result may obtain even when the number of observed variables exceeds, possibly by far, the number of unobserved shocks. In the latter situation, there are many different policy-instrument rules consistent with the observation set and feasible path considered. However, there may exist a "canonical rule" from which all these rules can be derived by two operations that can either preserve or undo, but not restore, robust local-equilibrium determinacy: multiplication by polynomials in the lag operator, and addition to linear combinations, whose coefficients are polynomials in the lag operator, of the structural equations.
Therefore, when this canonical rule does not ensure robust local-equilibrium determinacy, none of those rules does, and the feasible path considered is not implementable.
Applications. These general results can be applied to many different models, policy instruments, observation sets, and feasible paths. In this paper, for the sake of brevity, I consider only two applications.
In the first application, I show that optimal feasible monetary policy (a shortcut for the welfaremaximizing feasible path when the policy instrument is the interest rate) may not be implementable in the basic New Keynesian model for a reasonable observation set of the central bank, even when the number of observed endogenous variables largely exceeds the number of unobserved exogenous shocks.
For some values of the structural parameters, the optimal feasible path is not implementable because it cannot be obtained as the unique local equilibrium under an interest-rate rule consistent with the central bank's observation set; and for other values, because it cannot be obtained as such in the minimally robust way required for implementability. This result has two important implications. First, it sounds a note of caution about one of the main lessons of the New Keynesian literature, namely the importance for central banks to track some key unobserved exogenous rates of interest such as, for instance, the counterfactual "natural rate of interest" (as emphasized by, e.g., Galí, 2008 , Chapter 8, and Woodford, 2003, Chapter 4) . From a normative perspective, the most important of these rates of interest is, ultimately, the exogenous value taken by the interest rate on the optimal feasible path.
As my result shows, however, even when this value can be inferred in many alternative ways, on the optimal feasible path, from the variables and shocks observed by the central bank, there may be no way of setting the interest rate as a function of these variables and shocks that implements this path as the robustly unique local equilibrium. In this case, any attempt to track this rate of interest and implement the optimal feasible path will inevitably result in local-equilibrium multiplicity or, in the presence of exogenous policy shocks of arbitrarily small variance, non-existence of a local equilibrium. Second, as an illustration of the possibility that optimal feasible stabilization policy may not be implementable, this result carries a lesson about the choice of a benchmark path in normative analyses. The literature typically considers the optimal feasible path as the benchmark (and typically considers an observation set for the policy maker that makes her observation-set constraint slack in the optimization programme defining this path). However, even for a reasonable observation set of the policy maker, this benchmark may be too demanding, simply because the optimal feasible path may not be implementable. In this case, another natural benchmark to consider is the optimal implementable path or some proxy for this path.
The second application is about debt-stabilizing tax policy in the standard RBC model. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) consider, in this model, a labor-income-tax-rate rule and an income-tax-rate rule that stabilize the current stock of public debt (in the absence of policy-implementation lags) or the expected future stock of public debt (in the presence of such lags), and find that these rules lead to local-equilibrium multiplicity for many empirically relevant values of the structural parameters. This finding has largely been interpreted as an argument against the use of labor-income or income taxes to stabilize the current or expected future stock of public debt. I show however that, in the same model, for the same alternative tax instruments, and for a reasonable observation set of the tax authority, all feasible paths along which the current or expected future stock of public debt is stabilized are implementable for all theoretically admissible values of the structural parameters, even in the presence of policy-implementation lags of any length. This result implies that Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe's (1997) finding should be interpreted not as an argument against debt-stabilizing (labor-)income-tax policy per se, but instead as an argument against one specific − though natural − way of implementing this policy. This result also illustrates the fact that focusing on specific parametric families of policy-instrument rules may provide a misleading picture of the implementability of a given feasible path.
Methodological Contribution. On the methodological front, for each model, policy instrument, observation set, and implementable path, I show how to design arithmetically, i.e. with a finite number of arithmetic operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division), a policy-instrument rule that is consistent with this observation set and implements that path as the robustly unique local equilibrium in that model. More specifically, I show how to use Bézout's identity, the Euclidean division, and Cramer's rule, all of which involve a finite number of arithmetic operations, to transform the polynomials characterizing the structural equations and the implementable path into the polynomials characterizing the policy-instrument rule. This arithmetic-designability property implies that the coefficients of the policy-instrument rule can be explicitly expressed as rational functions of the structural and implementable-path parameters, i.e. as fractions of polynomial functions of these parameters. These functions are particularly easy to manipulate analytically. For instance, their derivatives can be easily computed to determine how the coefficients of the policy-instrument rule respond to an arbitrarily small change in the value of the structural or implementable-path parameters.
Discussion. Of course, unless the specific model, observation set, and implementable path considered are particularly simple, the policy-instrument rules that I design are typically more complex than the policy-instrument rules commonly considered in the literature, like Taylor's (1993) popular interest-rate rule, in the sense of involving a larger number of variables and shocks. This greater complexity does not matter at all in the rational-expectations paradigm. However, it might raise concerns about the relevance of this paradigm in that context. Such concerns should not be overstated. Actual decision procedures used by real-world policy makers amount to complex rules involving many inputs, yet this complexity does not seem to raise concerns of that kind. Svensson (2003 Svensson ( , 2011 argues that, even within the realm of rational-expectations models, the policy maker's complex reaction function need not be communicated to the private sector. Similarly, it can be argued that all that the private sector needs to know, for such a rule to effectively implement a given path, is the path itself (which the policy maker can communicate through the publication of conditional economic forecasts) and the existence of such a rule, but not the rule itself. One of the main contributions of this paper is precisely to identify conditions under which there exists such a rule, and conditions under which there does not.
As in most of the literature on stabilization policy, I focus throughout the paper on local-equilibrium determinacy, that is to say that I abstract from the possible existence of non-local equilibria. In the context of interest-rate rules, as argued by Cochrane (2011) , there is usually no solid economic reason to assume away the existence of non-local equilibria. The most common policy proposal to eliminate them, made initially by Christiano and Rostagno (2001) consists in switching from an interest-rate rule ensuring local-equilibrium determinacy to a moneygrowth rule (possibly accompanied by a non-Ricardian fiscal policy) when the economy goes outside a specified neighborhood of the steady state considered. The interest-rate rules that I design (when the policy instrument is the interest rate) fit naturally into this proposal, insofar as they are followed by the central bank inside the specified neighborhood.
Related Papers. This paper is not the first one to analytically design policy-instrument rules implementing a given local path as the (robustly) unique local equilibrium in a given model. Some papers − e.g., Evans and Honkapohja (2003) , Svensson and Woodford (2005) , and Woodford (2003, Chapter 7) − do just that. However, these papers consider a specific model (typically a simple New Keynesian model), a specific stabilization-policy instrument (typically the interest rate), and a specific local path (typically the optimal, i.e. welfare-optimizing, local path). Moreover, they do not explicitly require the local path and the policy-instrument rule to be consistent with a given observation set of the policy maker, i.e., they implicitly consider an observation set that is large enough for the corresponding observation-set constraint to be slack in the optimization programme defining the optimal feasible path and for the rule that they design to be consistent with this observation set. My contribution is therefore to generalize their results along four dimensions − in terms of model, policy instrument, observation set, and feasible path − as well as to determine whether the feasible path considered is implementable in the first place.
Making this contribution requires to develop a new method of designing policy-instrument rules, as the methods used in this literature can be applied only to simple models and local paths.
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Nor is this paper the first one to design, in a general framework, policy specifications that are consistent with a given local path and ensure local-equilibrium determinacy. Indeed, Giannoni and Woodford (2010) design, in a broad class of models, "target criteria" that are consistent with the optimal path (for a given objective function) and ensure local-equilibrium determinacy. However, these criteria are not required to be formulated as a policy-instrument rule consistent with a given observation set of the policy maker. 6 In fact, in many applications, they will not even be formulated as a policy-instrument rule (as they will not involve the current policy instrument). 7 They are not meant to describe how optimal stabilization policy could be implemented, but are instead proposed as, in Svensson and Woodford's (2005) terminology, a "higher-level policy specification." In this optimal-policy context, my contribution is therefore to determine whether and how these criteria can be operationally implemented given the policy maker's observation set, i.e. whether and how the policy maker can set the policy instrument as a function of only elements of her observation set to implement, as the robustly unique local equilibrium, the path that is optimal subject to her observation-set constraint − whether this constraint is slack, as implicitly assumed by Giannoni and Woodford (2010) Finally, this paper is also related to Bassetto (2002 Bassetto ( , 2004 Bassetto ( , 2005 . Indeed, like the latter, it tackles implementation problems in macroeconomics by requiring that the policy maker's out-of-equilibrium behavior be feasible − i.e., in my case, consistent with her observation set. However, there are two important differences. First, this paper addresses a general local-equilibrium-determinacy issue, while
Bassetto's papers address some specific global-equilibrium-determinacy issues. Second, the constraints faced out of equilibrium by the policy maker are only informational in this paper, while they may be either informational or physical in Bassetto's papers.
Outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines feasible paths and implementable paths in a broad class of locally linearizable dynamic stochastic rational-expectations models.
Section 3 provides, in this class of models, for various alternative observation sets of the policy maker, conditions for feasible paths to be (non-)implementable. Section 4 applies these general results to the (non-)implementability of optimal feasible monetary policy in the basic New Keynesian model and debtstabilizing feasible tax policy in the standard RBC model. Section 5 further discusses the general results obtained in Section 3 and, in particular, highlights the methodological contribution of the paper. I then conclude and provide a technical appendix.
5 These methods consist essentially in (i) considering a given parametric family (possibly a singleton) of policy-instrument rules consistent with the local path considered, and (ii) showing that, for each theoretically admissible value of the structural and local-path parameters, there exists, in this family, a rule ensuring (robust) local-equilibrium determinacy. In practice, the computations become analytically intractable as soon as the degree of the characteristic polynomial of the implied system (made of the structural equations and the rule considered) reaches the value four or five.
6 Similarly, the policy-instrument rules that I design in a general framework in Loisel (2009), which not only are consistent with a given local path and ensure local-equilibrium determinacy, but also eliminate equilibrium trajectories gradually leaving the neighborhood of the steady state considered, are not required to be consistent with a given observation set of the policy maker. 7 These criteria involve only the past, current, or expected future values of the endogenous variables and exogenous shocks featuring in the objective function considered when this function is purely quadratic.
Feasible Paths and Implementable Paths
This section introduces the concepts of feasible path and implementable path in a broad class of dynamic stochastic discrete-time infinite-horizon rational-expectations models. Each model of this class admits at least one steady state in the neighborhood of which its equilibrium conditions are log-linearizable. I restrict the analysis to the neighborhood of this steady state, log-linearize the equilibrium conditions in that neighborhood, and express all endogenous variables and exogenous shocks as log-deviations from their steady-state values. The agents are a policy maker (PM) and a private sector (PS).
Structural Equations
The behavior of PS consists in setting, at each date t ∈ Z, an N -dimension vector of endogenous variables Y t according to the following N structural equations:
where i t denotes the policy instrument set by PM at date t and ξ t a M -dimension vector of exogenous disturbances, with (M, N ) ∈ N * 2 and n ∈ N. 8 These equations are parametrized by
denotes the set of polynomials in X whose coefficients are m 1 × m 2 matrices with real-number elements. Throughout the paper, 0 denotes a vector or a matrix whose elements are all equal to zero (and whose dimension depends on the specific context in which it is used). Moreover, L denotes the lag operator and E t {.} the rational-expectations operator conditionally on the observation set of PS when it sets Y t . I assume for simplicity that this observation set is made of all the previous moves of PM and PS as well as all current and past exogenous disturbances, thus abstracting from any observation constraint of PS, in order to focus on the implications of PM's observation constraints. Finally, each exogenous disturbance,
i.e. each element of ξ t , follows a stationary VARMA process:
where
is diagonal and such that |D(0)| = 0 and all the roots of |D(X)| lie outside the unit circle of the complex plane; E(X) ∈ R M ×M [X] is diagonal and such that |E(X)| = 0; and ε t is a M -dimension vector of exogenous shocks such that E{ε t } = 0, E{ε t ε t } = I M , and E{ε t ε t−k } = 0
for any k ∈ Z * . In turn, |.| denotes the determinant operator (when applied to a matrix), E{.} the unconditional-mean operator, and I m , for any m ∈ N * , the m × m identity matrix.
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Two remarks are in order about the general specification (1) for the structural equations. First, this specification explicitly features an arbitrary finite number of lags and expected leads of the endogenous variables Y t and i t set at date t. As is well known, this system could be rewritten in an equivalent reduced form with no lags and only one expected lead, as is typically encountered in the literature (e.g., Svensson, 2011; Giannoni and Woodford, 2002; Woodford, 2003, Chapter 8) . I depart from the literature in this respect because I want to distinguish endogenous variables according to the date at which they 8 Throughout the paper, I use letters in bold to denote vectors and matrices that have (at least potentially) more than one element. 9 The assumption that D(X) and E(X) are diagonal, which is made for convenience, is not restrictive at all. Indeed, if they were not diagonal, then, using Cramer's rule, the stochastic process of ξ t could be rewritten in an equivalent form of type
εt (so that ξ t follows a process of type (2) with diagonal matrices).
are set, in order to be able to specify explicitly which endogenous variables PM observes when she sets her policy instrument. This reduced form, which gathers endogenous variables set at different dates within the same vector, would therefore be ill-suited for my purpose.
Second, despite appearances, this general specification allows for the presence of any past expectation of PS in the structural equations, simply because these equations may feature any Y t−k with k ∈ N * and Y t may contain any expectation formed by PS at date t. 10 Therefore, this specification encompasses models with policy-transmission lags of the kind considered by, e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1999 (2005) . In these models, PS decides unconditionally in advance on (at least some of) its actions, so that the structural equations make (at least some of) its current actions depend on its past expectations.
Technical Assumptions
I make five non-restrictive assumptions on A(X) and B(X). To state these assumptions, let me introduce the following notations. For each j ∈ {1, ..., N }, let u j denote the N -element vector whose j th element is equal to one and whose other elements are equal to zero. Let S A ≡ {j ∈ {1, ..., N }|u j A(X) = 0} denote the set of integers j such that the j th structural equation features at least one endogenous variable set by PS, and S B ≡ {j ∈ {1, ..., N }|u j B(X) = 0} the set of integers j such that the j th structural equation
features the policy instrument. Throughout the paper, for any polynomial P(X) whose coefficients are either real numbers or matrices with real-number elements, let d P denote the degree of P(X), and 
. Lastly, let R[X] denote the set of polynomials in X with real-number coefficients, and only elements of {E t {u j Y t+k }|k ∈ Z} and {E t {ξ t+k }|k ∈ Z}, so that the variable u j Y t should then be considered as exogenous, not endogenous.
In addition, I make for convenience the following assumption: Assumption 6 ("weak Sargent-Wallace property"): the system of structural equations (1) has at least one stationary solution for (Y t ) t∈Z whatever the exogenous stationary process for (i t ) t∈Z .
This assumption is sufficient, but not necessary for the results that I obtain. I make it nonetheless because it can be stated in a simple and transparent way, unlike weaker assumptions, and because it seems little restrictive anyway, at least in a monetary-policy context.
11 Indeed, it is well known that existing DSGE models of the monetary transmission mechanism typically have what Giannoni and Woodford (2002) and Woodford (2003, Chapter 8) call the "Sargent-Wallace property," after Sargent and Wallace (1975) , that is to say that interest-rate rules expressing the interest rate as a function of only exogenous shocks typically lead to local-equilibrium multiplicity in these models. Therefore, these models typically have the weaker Sargent-Wallace property stated in Assumption 6, i.e. they typically satisfy this assumption.
Policy-Instrument Rule
The behavior of PM is described by a rule that expresses i t as a function of the elements of the observation set of PM when she sets i t . Let O t denote this observation set. All the alternative sets O t that I will consider are included in the set made of the current and past endogenous variables set by PS, the past policy instruments, and the current and past exogenous shocks: 
Feasible Paths and Implementable Paths
I consider the class of state-contingent paths for the endogenous variables that can be written as stationary VARMA processes driven by the vector of exogenous shocks ε t . In other words, I consider the class of paths that can be written in the form
is such that |S(0)| = 0 and all the roots of |S(X)| lie outside the unit circle, and T(X) ∈ R (N +1)×M [X] . I then define feasible paths and implementable paths as follows:
Definition 1 (Feasible Path): given an observation set O t ⊆ {Y t , i t−1 , ε t }, a path P of type (4) is said to be feasible when there exists a rule R of type (3) (i) expressing i t as a function of only elements of O t and (ii) such that P is one stationary solution of the system made of (1) and R.
11 Lemma 2 states the weaker but more complex condition that is actually used to establish the results. (1) and R, and (iii) such that the system made of (1) and the rule obtained by adding an exogenous policy shock of arbitrarily small variance to R has a unique stationary solution, which is arbitrarily close to P .
A feasible path is therefore a path that can be obtained as one local equilibrium under a policy-instrument rule consistent with PM's observation set, while an implementable path is a path that can be obtained, in a minimally robust way, as the unique local equilibrium under such a rule. An implementable path is, of course, necessarily feasible. But a feasible path may not be implementable. Section 3 of the paper is precisely devoted to the study of feasible-path implementability.
The minimal-robustness requirement for implementability − i.e., Condition (iii) of Definition 2 − is imposed to avoid knife-edge results. The exogenous policy shock of arbitrarily small variance mentioned in this condition can be interpreted as, for instance, the policy maker's "trembling hand" or her round-off errors on the elements of O t . 12 As I illustrate in the next subsection, the case in which some rules satisfy Conditions (i) and (ii) but not Condition (iii) may naturally arise because of a stochastic singularity.
An Illustration
This subsection illustrates, in the simplest possible setup (with N = M = 1), two different ways in which a feasible path may not be implementable. Consider a log-linearized model in which at each date t ∈ Z, PS sets a single endogenous variable, y t , according to the following structural equation:
with ξ t = ε t + βε t−1 , where α ∈ R * , β ∈ R, and ε t is an i.i.d. exogenous shock realized at date t. Assume that the observation set of PM when she sets i t is O t = {y t , i t−1 }. For any θ ∈ R * , consider the path
, which satisfies (5). On this path, noted P θ , i t can be expressed as a function of only elements of O t :
so that P θ is feasible. To study the implementability of P θ , let me first note that all the rules of type (3) consistent with O t and P θ can be written in a form of type
with P(X) ∈ R[X] and P(0) = 0. Since (6) implies (7), any local equilibrium under rule (6) is also a local equilibrium under any rule of type (7). Now, under rule (6), the dynamics of y t is governed by the following equation:
obtained by replacing i t in (5) by the right-hand side of (6). Solving (8) for y t requires to distinguish between three alternative cases regarding the values of the structural parameters α and β and the feasible-path parameter θ.
First, α, β, and θ may be such that both roots of the polynomial
inside the unit circle of the complex plane. In this case, there is an infinity of local equilibria under rule (6), as follows from Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) analysis, and therefore an infinity of local equilibria under any rule of type (7). As a consequence, P θ cannot be obtained as the unique local equilibrium under a policy-instrument rule consistent with O t , so that it is not implementable.
Second, α, β, and θ may be such that both roots of Q(X) lie outside the unit circle. In that case, the system made of (5) and (6) does not meet Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) order condition, but it has nonetheless a unique stationary solution, i.e. there is a unique local equilibrium under rule (6), which is P θ . Given the absence of initial conditions, this local-equilibrium-determinacy result is due to a stochastic singularity: the equation (8) is expressed in terms of the variable y t − θε t without any exogenous residual term. This result is, however, not robust to the introduction of an exogenous policy shock e t of arbitrarily small variance. Indeed, if rule (6) is replaced by
then the equation (8) becomes
0, so that the stochastic singularity disappears, and there is no local equilibrium. Similarly, for any
such that P(0) = 0, there is no local equilibrium if the policy maker follows the rule
instead of rule (7). Therefore, P θ cannot be obtained, in the minimally robust way described in Condition (iii) of Definition 2, as the unique local equilibrium under a policy-instrument rule consistent with O t , so that it is not implementable.
Third, α, β, and θ may be such that one root of Q(X) lies inside the unit circle, and the other outside.
In this last case, it is straightforward to check that P θ can be obtained, in the minimally robust way just mentioned, as the unique local equilibrium under a policy-instrument rule consistent with O t , so that it is implementable.
The (Non-)Implementability of Feasible Paths
This section derives conditions for feasible-path (non-)implementability in the class of models presented in the previous section. I first describe the class of alternative observation sets that I consider for PM, and then examine three different cases in turn, depending on whether there are some unobserved shocks, and, if there are some, whether they can be inferred from the observation set using only (1) and (2).
Class of PM's Observation Sets
I consider the class of alternative observation sets O t of type
where ( Y , ε ) ∈ N 2 , J and K are two sets such that J * ⊆ J ⊆ {1, ..., N } and K ⊆ {1, ..., M }, and, for each k ∈ {1, ..., M }, v k denotes the M -element vector whose k th element is equal to one and whose other elements are equal to zero. In turn,
denotes the set of integers j such that the structural equations (1) feature a term of type
Four main remarks are in order about this class of observation sets. First, it allows for the possibility that some endogenous variables are never observed by PM (when J {1, ..., N }). These unobserved variables may be, for instance, Lagrange multipliers of PS's optimization problems, expectations of PS (when Y t includes some expectations of PS, as in, e.g., models with policy-transmission lags of the kind briefly discussed in Subsection 2.1), or variables about which PM receives a noisy signal. Second, the assumption J * ⊆ J is made for convenience, essentially to overcome difficulties raised by Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) rank condition. This assumption is typically not restrictive when the unobserved variables are expectations of PS or variables about which PM receives a contemporaneous noisy signal. Indeed, the structural equations can then typically be written in a form of type (1) . 15 Moreover, these observation lags may apply not only to endogenous variables, but also to exogenous shocks, for instance to exogenous foreign macroeconomic developments.
Case 1: Observed Shocks
I start with the benchmark case in which (i) PM observes all exogenous shocks, i.e. K = {1, ..., M }, and
(ii) observation lags on shocks are not strictly longer than observation lags on variables, i.e. ε ≤ Y .
Condition (i) makes this case admittedly restrictive, but the results obtained will also serve, in the next subsection, as a useful starting point to investigate an alternative case in which not all exogenous shocks are observed. Condition (ii) is imposed mostly for convenience and could be relaxed at the cost of greater complexity. In this benchmark case, the rules of type (3) that are consistent with O t are those 13 Observation lags of length ε = Y ≡ are, of course, equivalent to policy-implementation lags of length , which compel PM to choose unconditionally the value of her policy instrument periods in advance (as in, e.g., Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 1997).
14 This alternative within-period-timing assumption is arguably better suited to capture the fact that, due to informationcollecting, information-processing, and decision-making frictions, the policy maker takes her decisions at a lower frequency than the private sector considered as a whole (though not necessarily than each individual private agent).
15 Some variables, most notably some financial-market prices, can clearly be observed with negligible lags by the policy maker. However, as argued by Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996, p. 40) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999, pp. 93-94) , the policy maker may still react with non-negligible lags to these variables because of data-processing and decision-making frictions.
that satisfy
and if ε ≥ 1, then ∀k ∈ {0, ..
To study feasible-path implementability in this case, let me first establish two useful preliminary results.
To that aim, let me note n
, for each j ∈ S B , the maximum lead of the policy instrument featuring in the j th structural equation, and let me call "eigenvalues" of a rational-expectations system that can be written in Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) form the eigenvalues of the matrix that characterizes the deterministic part of this form. 16 The first preliminary result can be stated as follows:
the system made of the structural equations (1) and this rule can be written in Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) form with n a ≡ N j=1 n a j non-predetermined variables, and its non-zero eigenvalues are (and have the same multiplicity as) the non-zero roots of the polynomial
Proof : see Appendix A.1.
In short, Appendix A.1 essentially uses (i) Assumption 4 and Condition (13) to show that the system mentioned in Lemma 1 has exactly n a non-predetermined variables, and (ii) a standard result in timeseries analysis (see, e.g., Hamilton, 1994, Chapter 10, Proposition 10.1) to show that the non-zero eigenvalues of this system are the non-zero roots of (14) . 17 Now, for any set J ⊆ {1, ..., N }, let D J (X) ∈ R[X] denote the greatest common divisor, defined up to a non-zero real-number multiplicative scalar, of all the polynomials ∆ j (X) for j ∈ J ∪ {N + 1} (none of which is zero, given Assumptions 4 and 5). The second preliminary result is the following:
Lemma 2: for any set J ⊆ {1, ..., N }, D J (X) has at most n a roots outside the unit circle (taking into account their multiplicity).
Proof : see Appendix A.2.
16 In other words, the eigenvalues of a rational-expectations system that can be written in a form of type Et{X t+1 } = MXt + η t , where Xt is a vector of endogenous variables set at date t or earlier and η t a vector of stochastic exogenous terms realized at date t or earlier, are the eigenvalues of the matrix M. In particular, the eigenvalues of a path of type (4) are the roots of |X d S S(X −1 )|, as follows from a standard result in time-series analysis (see, e.g., Hamilton, 1994, Chapter 10, Proposition 10.1).
17 Many DSGE models are such that max{n b j − n a j |j ∈ S B } < 0 and therefore such that all rules of type (3) meet Condition (13) . However, DSGE models with policy-transmission lags of the kind briefly discussed in Subsection 2.1 are often such that max{n b j − n a j |j ∈ S B } ≥ 0, because their system of structural equations, when written in a form of type (1) satisfying Assumptions 1 to 6, often includes an equation of type zt ≡ Et{i t+d } (and other equations involving z t−d ), where d ∈ N * denotes the length of the policy-transmission lag. 
Proof : see Appendix A.3.
Appendix A.3 proves Proposition 1 by designing, for each observation set and feasible path, a policyinstrument rule that is consistent with this observation set and implements that path as the robustly unique local equilibrium. It derives the coefficients of this rule from the structural and feasible-path parameters, i.e. F(X), G(X), and H(X) from A(X), B(X), C(X), D(X), E(X), S(X), and T(X), using a new method that rests on Bézout's identity, the Euclidean division, and Cramer's rule. More specifically, it first uses Bézout's identity to design (
, where |.| denotes the cardinality operator (when applied to a set). 18 It then uses the Euclidian division and Lemma 2 to design, from (U j (X)) j∈J ∪{N +1} , some F(X) and G(X) such that (i) F(X) satisfies (10), (11), and (13), (ii) (14) has exactly n a roots outside the unit circle (taking into account their multiplicity), and (iii) the roots of (14) inside the unit circle are the eigenvalues of the feasible path considered. At this stage, given Lemma 1, any rule of type (3) with these F(X) and G(X)
is such that the system made of the structural equations (1) and this rule has (i) a unique stationary solution (even when an exogenous policy shock is added to this rule), and (ii) the same eigenvalues inside the unit circle as the feasible path considered. Finally, Appendix A.3 uses Cramer's rule to residually design some H(X) satisfying (12) and such that the feasible path considered is one, and hence the unique, stationary solution of this system. The fact that this system has the same eigenvalues inside the unit circle as the feasible path considered ensures that this H(X) is a polynomial, i.e. a power series of finite degree.
Interestingly, Proposition 1 implies that observation lags − or, equivalently, policy-implementation lags − are irrelevant for feasible-path implementability in Case 1. This irrelevance result may be viewed as surprising. Indeed, most of the policy-instrument rules considered in the literature, at least in the context of DSGE models of the monetary transmission mechanism, manage to ensure (robust) local-equilibrium determinacy by requiring the policy instrument to react out of equilibrium to current endogenous variables (as already mentioned in the previous subsection). If anything, the literature suggests that, by preventing PM from reacting out of equilibrium to current or even recent endogenous variables, observation lags reduce her ability to ensure local-equilibrium determinacy. 19 I show however that, in fact, they do not − provided that PM's choice is not arbitrarily restricted to a specific parametric family of policy-instrument rules. In essence, the reason is that, in models that raise non-trivial localequilibrium-indeterminacy issues, PS's current actions depend directly on its expectation of its future actions and, therefore, indirectly on its expectation of the future policy instrument. Now, by imposing an out-of-equilibrium reaction of the current policy instrument to PS's past actions, a rule also imposes an out-of-equilibrium reaction of PS's expectation of the future policy instrument to its current actions.
The latter reaction can be viewed as the feedback mechanism that ensures (robust) local-equilibrium determinacy.
Case 2: Unobserved but Inferable Shocks
I now turn to the case in which (i) PM does not observe all exogenous shocks, i.e. K {1, ..., M },
(ii) ε = Y ≡ , and (iii) the unobserved shocks {v k ε t− |k ∈ {1, ..., M } K} can be inferred from
only the structural equations (1) and the stochastic process (2), i.e., without using the feasible path considered. 20 By the latter condition, I mean more specifically that (1) and (2) imply a relationship of the form
is such that |Γ(0)| = 0 and all the roots of |Γ(X)| lie outside the unit circle,
, and, for any statement s, 1 s ≡ 1 if s is true and 1 s ≡ 0 if s is wrong.
For any path P that would be feasible if the observation set were
Proposition 1 can be used to establish the existence of a rule R of type (3) satisfying (10), (11), and (12) with ε = Y , consistent with P , and robustly ensuring local-equilibrium determinacy. Write R as
and multiply its left-and right-hand sides by |Γ(L)| to get the
|Γ(L)|ε t and then use (15) − rewritten in terms of |Γ(L)|ε t using Cramer's rule − to get a rule R of type (3) satisfying (10), (11) , and (12) with ε = Y , such that H(X)v k = 0 for each k ∈ {1, ..., M } K, and consistent with P . This transformation of R into R shows that P is feasible also when
Moreover, this transformation is neutral for local-equilibrium determinacy. Indeed, the system made of (1), (2), and R is equivalent to, and hence has the same stationary solution(s) for (Y t , i t ) t∈Z as, the system made of (1), (2), and R . In turn, the latter system has the same stationary solution(s) for (Y t , i t ) t∈Z as the system made of (1), (2), and R, since whatever Γ(X), R has a unique stationary
which corresponds to R. Given that P is the unique local equilibrium under R, it is also the unique local equilibrium under R and under R . Finally, since adding an exogenous policy shock to R is neutral for local-equilibrium determinacy and all the roots of |Γ(X)| lie outside the unit circle, adding an exogenous policy shock to R is also neutral for local-equilibrium determinacy, so that P is also implementable
As a consequence, I obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 (Feasible-Path Implementability in Case 2): for any set J such that J * ⊆ J ⊆ {1, ..., N }, any set K {1, ..., M }, and any ∈ N, if (1) and (2) imply a relationship of type (15),
i) the set of feasible paths is the same as when 
Case 3: Unobserved and Non-Inferable Shocks
The last case that I consider is one in which (i) PM does not observe all exogenous shocks, i.e. K {1, ..., M }, and (ii) a certain condition is met, which requires that, in models raising non-trivial localequilibrium-indeterminacy issues (i.e., models such that n a ≥ 1), at least one unobserved shock cannot be inferred from O t using only (1) and (2). To state this condition, let me note R(X) the set of rational expressions − i.e. fractions of polynomials − in X with real-number coefficients, and rank R(X) the rank operator over R(X). 21 Consider a given feasible path, note it P , and write it as (4). The set R P of rules of type (3) that are consistent with O t and P , i.e. that express i t as a function of only elements of O t and are satisfied on P , is strictly included in the set R P of equations that involve only elements of ∪ t∈Z O t and can be written as linear combinations, with coefficients in R(L), of the N + 1 equations of (4). The latter set is a vector space over R(L), of dimension
, where, for each j ∈ {1, ..., N + 1}, w j denotes the (N + 1)-element vector whose j th element is equal to one and whose other elements are equal to zero. Now, let E denote the set of equations that involve only elements of ∪ t∈Z O t and can be written as linear combinations, with coefficients in R(L), of the N equations of (1) and M equations of (2). This set is also a vector space over R(L). Given Assumption 4, its dimension is
, where S ≡ {j ∈ {1, ..., N }|n a j = 0, n b j ≤ 0} denotes the set of integers j such that the j th structural equation is not forward-looking. Since the structural equations are satisfied on P , E is a subspace of R P , so that dim(R P ) ≥ dim(E). The condition characterizing Case 3 is dim(R P ) = dim(E) + 1.
21 For instance, a matrix M(X) ∈ R N ×N [X] is of rank N over R(X) when ∀(P 1 (X), ..., P N (X)) ∈ R(X) N (0, ..., 0),
I use the field of rational expressions R(X), rather than the ring of polynomials R[X], because the rank operator and vector spaces are defined over fields, not rings.
To derive the implications of Condition (16) for the inferability of unobserved shocks, suppose for a moment that all the unobserved shocks can be inferred from O t using only (1) and (2) . Then dim(R P ) = |J | + 1 − (M − |K|), so that Condition (16) implies that dim(E) = |J | − (M − |K|). In turn, the latter equality implies that none of the structural equations is forward-looking (i.e. S = {1, ..., N }, or equivalently n a = 0), given Assumption 4 and the assumption J * ⊆ J . Therefore, provided that at least one structural equation is forward-looking (i.e. S {1, ..., N }, or equivalently n a ≥ 1), Condition (16) requires that at least one unobserved shock cannot be inferred from O t using only (1) and (2).
To study feasible-path implementability in Case 3, let me first define the canonical rules for a feasible path as follows: Consider a given canonical rule for a given feasible path P satisfying (16), note it C P , and write it as (3). 22 Given that C P ∈ R P and C P / ∈ E, Condition (16) implies that R P = E ⊕ C P , where ⊕ denotes the direct-sum operator and C P the one-dimension subspace spanned by
}. Now consider a given policy-instrument rule consistent with O t and P , i.e. a given element of R P , and note it R. Since R P ⊆ R P , R is also an element of R P . As such, it can be written as the sum of an element of E and an element of C P . Let R denote the latter element.
where the rational expression Q(X) is a polynomial: Q(X) ∈ R[X]. The system made of (1) and R is equivalent to the system made of (1) and R , so that R implements P (as the robustly unique local equilibrium) if and only if R does. In turn, the system made of (1) and R has the same stationary solution(s) for (Y t , i t ) t∈Z as the system made of (1) and C P , since whatever
, which corresponds to C P . Therefore, R implements P if and only if C P does and all the roots of Q(X) lie outside the unit circle, and hence only if C P does.
Finally, C P implements P if and only if C P robustly ensures local-equilibrium determinacy. This result can be stated in the following way:
Proposition 3 (Feasible-Path Implementability in Case 3): for any set J such that J * ⊆ J ⊆ {1, ..., N }, any set K {1, ..., M }, and any
|j ∈ J , k ∈ K}, any feasible path P satisfying (16) is implementable if and only if an arbitrarily given canonical rule for P robustly ensures local-equilibrium determinacy.
In this case, Condition (16) can be rewritten as |J | + 1 − (M − |K|) = dim(E) + 1, so that there are dim(E) + 1 more observed variables than unobserved shocks, and therefore dim(E) + 1 degrees of freedom in the choice of a policy-instrument rule consistent with the observation set and feasible path considered. 22 The existence of a canonical rule for P is implied by Definition 1 and Condition (16) .
However, as Proposition 3 says, these degrees of freedom cannot be exploited to find, among all these rules, one that ensures robust local-equilibrium determinacy. The reason is that all these rules can be derived from a canonical rule by two operations that can either preserve or undo, but not restore, robust local-equilibrium determinacy: multiplication by elements of R[L] (which corresponds to one degree of freedom), and addition to linear combinations, with coefficients in R(L), of the structural equations (which corresponds to dim(E) degrees of freedom). Thus, a feasible path may not be implementable even when the number of observed variables exceeds, possibly by far, the number of unobserved shocks.
I illustrate this possibility in the next section in the context of optimal monetary policy in the basic New Keynesian model.
Two Applications
The general results established in the previous section can be applied to many different models, policy instruments, observation sets, and feasible paths. In this section, for the sake of brevity, I consider only two applications, which show that feasible-path (non-)implementability may be an issue in textbook models, for standard policy instruments, relevant observation sets, and interesting feasible paths. The results that I obtain can be summarized as follows. 
Optimal Monetary Policy in the Basic New Keynesian Model
In this subsection, I study the implementability of optimal feasible monetary policy in the well known basic New Keynesian model. Some fifteen years ago, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999, p. 103) wrote that "the construction of a feedback rule for the funds rate that implements the optimal allocation − that is not only consistent with it but also renders it the unique stationary equilibrium consistent with the proposed policy rule − remains a nontrivial problem." In essence, this statement is still valid today when the optimal allocation and the feedback rule are required to be consistent with a given observation set all the endogenous variables and exogenous disturbances as log-deviations from their values at that steady state. In most of the subsection, I focus on the case in which the economy is hit by only two exogenous disturbances, one affecting the discount factor and the other the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods. In this case, at each date t ∈ Z, PS sets the consumption level c t , the inflation rate π t , the output level y t , hours worked n t , and the real wage w t , according to the following structural equations:
where i t denotes the interest rate set by the central bank (CB) at date t. These structural equations are, respectively, the Euler equation, the Phillips curve, the goods-market-clearing condition, the production function, and the consumption vs. leisure trade-off condition. I assume that the exogenous disturbances η t and u t follow stationary ARMA(1,1) processes:
where ε The structural parameters are the labor elasticity of output α, the discount factor β, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ, the reduced-form parameter κ, the steady-state ratio of government purchases to output s, the inverse of the Frisch labor-supply elasticity χ, the auto-regressive parameters ρ η and ρ u , and the moving-average parameters θ η and θ u . They are such that 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1, γ > 0, κ > 0, 0 ≤ s < 1, χ > 0, −1 < ρ η < 1, and −1 < ρ u < 1 (while θ η and θ u may take any real-number value).
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The observation set that I consider for CB is O t = {c t−1 , π t−1 , y t−1 , n t−1 , w t−1 , i t−1 }. This observation set has three notable features. First, it contains no exogenous shock, which seems reasonable given the nature of the two shocks considered. Second, it contains no current endogenous variable. This feature is necessary for the existence of a well defined optimal feasible path. 24 Moreover, as mentioned in Subsection 3.1, it can be viewed as a consequence of the timing − considered in many studies of monetary-policy implementation − in which CB plays before PS within each period, and this timing is arguably better suited than the reverse timing to capture the fact that central banks take their decisions at a lower frequency than the private sector considered as a whole. Third, this observation set contains no expectation of PS. This last feature captures the fact that the available measures of the private sector's expectations (measures that can be inferred from survey responses or financial-market prices) are often viewed as less reliable than the data about the private sector's actions (e.g., data about consumption, output, or inflation).
25
The goal of this subsection is to study the implementability of the timeless-perspective optimal feasible path, i.e., the path that maximizes welfare from Woodford's (1999b) timeless perspective subject to the structural equations and CB's observation-set constraint. 26 I assume for simplicity that the steady 23 I allow for s > 0 to prepare the ground for the introduction of government-purchases disturbances at the end of the subsection. And I allow for |θη| ≥ 1 and |θu| ≥ 1 because there is no economic reason to rule out non-fundamental ARMA disturbances, as stressed by, e.g., Lippi and Reichlin (1993) . In particular, the limit case in which θη and θu tend towards infinity can be interpreted as a situation in which news shocks perfectly inform PS about one-period-ahead disturbances, as I elaborate below. 24 Indeed, if CB's observation set were instead Ot = {c t , π t , y t , n t , w t , i t−1 }, then all the interest-rate rules consistent with Ot and the optimal feasible path would have infinite coefficients − a possibility that my framework does not allow for − because it would be the only endogenous variable whose value on this path depends on ε η t . 25 Similarly, in the literature on structural-shock identification initiated by Sargent (1981, 1991 ) and mentioned in Subsection 5.2, the econometrician is assumed to observe the private sector's actions but not its expectations. 26 This path can be defined as the limit of the date-t 0 Ramsey-optimal feasible path as t 0 → −∞. The date-t 0 Ramsey-state considered is efficient (due to an employment or production subsidy offsetting the monopolisticcompetition distortion), so that the second-order approximation of the date-t welfare loss function in the neighborhood of this steady state is of the form 
, with rank(Ω 0 ) = 2; and the last line of (24) is a canonical rule for this path.
Proof : see Appendix A.4.
Interestingly, the timeless-perspective optimal feasible path (24) is inertial in response to both η and u disturbances, i.e., it makes (c t , π t , y t , n t , w t , i t ) depend on both η t−1 and u t−1 . By contrast, as is well known since Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (1999b) , when {η t , u t } ⊆ O t the timeless-perspective optimal feasible path is inertial only in response to u disturbances, i.e., it makes (c t , π t , y t , n t , w t , i t ) depend on u t−1 but not on η t−1 . To understand why the optimal responses to η disturbances are inertial when η t / ∈ O t , consider for simplicity the case in which η disturbances are i.i.d.
(i.e., ρ η = θ η = 0) and there are no u disturbances. In this case, the first-best path (c t , π t , y t , n t , w t , i t ) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, γ −1 η t ) is not feasible, because i t cannot depend on η t , and the optimal non-inertial feasible path is (c t , π t , y t , n t , w t ,
. Inertia then enables CB to make E t {c t+1 } + γE t {π t+1 } depend negatively on η t , and thus to relax the constraint imposed by the Euler equation (17) , in order to bring c t closer to zero − and therefore, via the Phillips curve (18) and the goods-market-clearing condition (19) , to bring also (π t , y t ) closer to zero. The optimal degree of inertia is the one that equalizes the marginal gain from bringing (y t , π t ) closer to (0, 0) and the marginal cost of moving (E t {y t+1 }, E t {π t+1 }) further away from (0, 0).
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To determine the implementability of the timeless-perspective optimal feasible path (24), I cannot use Proposition 2, since equations (17) to (23) do not imply any relationship of type (15): the history of the unobserved shocks ε η,t−1 and ε u,t−1 cannot be inferred from O t using only equations (17) to (23) , because the only structural equations involving the corresponding disturbances, (17) and (18), also involve unobserved expectations. Instead, I use Proposition 3. The system made of equations (17) to (23) is straightforwardly shown to be written in a form of type (1) and (2) with N = 5, Y t = [ c t π t y t n t w t ] , optimal feasible path is, in turn, defined as the state-contingent path for the endogenous variables that maximizes welfare at date t 0 subject to the structural equations and CB's observation-set constraint. I consider the timeless-perspective optimal feasible path, rather than the date-t 0 Ramsey-optimal feasible path, simply for consistency with the general analysis of the previous sections, in which feasible paths were specified as VARMA processes over t ∈ Z without initial conditions. 27 This optimal-inertia result was first obtained by Aoki (2006) , in the context of the same model (except for the stochastic process of the exogenous disturbances), for an observation set made of past endogenous variables and noisy signals about current endogenous variables. In the case of infinitely noisy signals, this observation set boils down to the one I consider.
, and n = 1, that satisfies Assumptions 1 to 6 for all theoretically admissible values of the structural parameters. 28 Moreover, the observation set considered is of type (9) with J = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, K = ∅, and Y = 1. Finally, the feasible path (24) − noted P for the occasion − is such that dim(R P ) = 4, since rank(Ω 0 ) = 2, while the equations (17) to (23) are such that dim(E) = 3. Therefore, dim(R P ) = dim(E) + 1: we are in Case 3, and Propositions 3 and 4
imply that the feasible path (24) is implementable if and only if the last line of (24) robustly ensures local-equilibrium determinacy.
The latter result can be explained as follows. There are dim(R P ) = 4 degrees of freedom in the choice of a policy-instrument rule consistent with the observation set and feasible path considered, essentially because this observation set includes, for each past date, six endogenous variables whose values on that feasible path depend on only two unobserved exogenous shocks. However, these degrees of freedom cannot be exploited to find a rule robustly ensuring local-equilibrium determinacy, because the vector space R P is spanned by the dim(E) = 3 intra-temporal structural equations (19) to (21) and the last line of (24) . In other words, any policy-instrument rule consistent with the observation set and feasible path considered can be written in a form of type α(L)
4 is such that α(0) = 0 and β(0) = γ(0) = δ(0) = 0. Therefore, any such rule robustly ensures local-equilibrium determinacy only if the last line of (24) does.
For any calibration of the model's structural parameters, I can thus determine numerically, using the analytical expression of (f that ρ η = ρ u ≡ ρ and θ η = θ u ≡ θ (so that the two disturbances follow identical stochastic processes). As shown in Figure 1 , I then obtain that the timeless-perspective optimal feasible path is not implementable for many admissible values of ρ and θ − broadly the same values under both calibrations.
For some values of ρ and θ (light-gray areas in Figure 1 ), this path is not implementable because all the interest-rate rules consistent with CB's observation set and this path lead to local-equilibrium multiplicity.
For other values of ρ and θ (dark-gray areas in Figure 1) , it is not implementable because, even though all the interest-rate rules consistent with CB's observation set and this path may ensure local-equilibrium determinacy, none does so in the minimally robust way required for feasible-path implementability:
adding an exogenous policy shock of arbitrarily small variance to any of these rules leads to non-existence of a local equilibrium. The latter case arises notably for positive values of ρ and θ provided that θ is sufficiently large, i.e. provided that the responses of the disturbances to the shocks are sufficiently humpshaped, the value θ = 3 (respectively θ = 2) being enough to make the path non-implementable for all values of ρ under Galí's (respectively Woodford's) calibration. In particular, this case arises for an infinite value of θ, i.e. for news shocks. 29 Finally, for still other values of ρ and θ (very-dark-gray areas in Figure 1 ), the timeless-perspective optimal feasible path is not implementable because all the interest-rate rules consistent with CB's observation set and this path lead to local-equilibrium multiplicity in the absence of exogenous policy shocks and to non-existence of a local equilibrium in the presence of such shocks. rates of interest such as, for instance, the counterfactual "natural rate of interest." 31 From a normative perspective, the most important of these rates of interest is, ultimately, the exogenous value taken by the interest rate on the optimal feasible path. 32 As my result shows, however, even when this value can be inferred in many alternative ways, on the optimal feasible path, from the endogenous variables observed by the central bank, there may be no way of setting the interest rate as a function of these variables that implements this path as the robustly unique local equilibrium. In this case, any attempt to track this rate of interest and implement the optimal feasible path will inevitably result in local-equilibrium multiplicity or, in the presence of exogenous policy shocks of arbitrarily small variance, non-existence of a local equilibrium.
This non-implementability result has been obtained under the assumption that the economy is hit by only two exogenous disturbances (affecting the discount factor and the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods). In Appendix A.5, I show that it is robust to the relaxation of this assumption. 30 In the first two cases, the system made of the structural equations (17) to (21) and the last line of (24) does not meet Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) order condition because it has strictly fewer (in the first case) or strictly more (in the second case) eigenvalues outside the unit circle than non-predetermined variables. In the third case, this system meets Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) order condition but not their rank condition.
31 In Galí's (2008, Chapter 8) words: "these new models identify tracking the natural equilibrium of the economy, which is not directly observable, as an important challenge for central banks." And in Woodford's (2003, Chapter 4): "keeping track of its current value would be an important (and far from trivial) task of central-bank staff." 32 The optimal path in question has to be the optimal feasible path for the central bank to be able to track this exogenous rate of interest successfully, i.e. to be able to infer it from her observation set on this path.
More specifically, I show that the set of structural-parameter values for which the timeless-perspective optimal feasible path is implementable is unaffected by the introduction of three additional disturbances into the model (affecting government purchases, productivity, and consumption utility or labor disutility, and following stationary fundamental ARMA processes), so that in particular Figure 1 is still valid in the presence of these additional disturbances. This robustness is essentially due to the facts that (i) the timeless-perspective optimal feasible path still meets Condition (16) in the presence of these additional disturbances, so that Proposition 3 can still be used to determine its implementability, and (ii) these additional disturbances appear in the intra-temporal structural equations, so that their realizations can be inferred from CB's observation set in a way that is neutral for robust local-equilibrium determinacy.
Debt-Stabilizing Tax Policy in the Standard RBC Model
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) consider, in a standard RBC model, a labor-income-tax-rate rule and an income-tax-rate rule that stabilize, both in and out of equilibrium, the current stock of public debt (in the absence of policy-implementation lags) or the expected future stock of public debt (in the presence of such lags). 33 They find that these rules lead to local-equilibrium multiplicity for many empirically relevant values of the structural parameters. Their finding has largely been interpreted as an argument against the use of labor-income or income taxes to stabilize the current or expected future stock of public debt. However, the fact that these (labor-)income-tax-rate rules fail to ensure local-equilibrium determinacy does not imply that all the (labor-)income-tax-rate rules that stabilize the current or expected future stock of public debt in equilibrium − but not necessarily out of equilibrium − fail to ensure local-equilibrium determinacy. In this subsection, I challenge the interpretation commonly made of their finding by using the general results of the previous section to show that, in the same model, for the same alternative tax instruments, and for a reasonable observation set of the tax authority, all feasible paths along which the current or expected future stock of public debt is stabilized are implementable for all theoretically admissible values of the structural parameters, even in the presence of policy-implementation lags of any length.
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In Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe's (1997) model, at each date t ∈ Z, PS sets the output level y t , the capital stock k t , investment x t , hours worked h t , the consumption level c t , the (after-tax) rental price of capital u t , and the (after-tax) wage w t , according to the following structural equations:
33 Most of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe's (1997) analysis is conducted in continuous time. I refer here to the discrete-time analysis conducted at the end of Section 3, in Section 4, and in the appendix of their paper. 34 Since Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997), several papers have shown that policy instruments other than labor-income or income taxes (e.g., government purchases in Guo and Harrison, 2004) can be used in the same model to stabilize the current or expected future stock of public debt without generating local-equilibrium multiplicity. My point is that this can be done even with labor-income or income taxes, provided that the current or expected future stock of public debt is not required to be stabilized also out of equilibrium.
where τ t denotes the labor-income-tax rate (when ω = 0) or income-tax rate (when ω = 1) set by the tax authority (T A) at date t, and d ∈ N the length of the tax-policy-implementation lags. The exogenous productivity and government-purchases disturbances a t and g t are assumed to follow stationary fundamental ARMA processes:
where ε a t and ε g t are i.i.d. exogenous shocks such that E{ε a t ε g t−k } = 0 for any k ∈ Z. 35 The structural parameters are γ, δ, s c , s h , s i , τ , χ, ω, and the coefficients of the polynomials ρ a (X), ρ g (X), θ a (X), and θ g (X). They are such that γ > 0, 0 < δ < 1, 0 < s c < 1, 0 < s i < 1, 0 < s c + s i < 1,
= 0, and all the roots of ρ a (X), ρ g (X), θ a (X), and θ g (X) lie outside the unit circle. The system made of equations (25) to (33) can straightforwardly be written in a form of type (1) and (2) with N = 7,
and n = 1, that satisfies Assumptions 1 to 6 for all theoretically admissible values of the structural parameters.
The observation set that I consider for T A is
∈ N. 36 This observation set is of type (9) with J = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, K = {2}, and ε = Y . Now, the history of the unobserved shock ε a,t− can be inferred from O t using only the structural equations (25) and (26) and the stochastic process (32) , since these equations and process imply the following relationship of type (15):
Therefore, we are in Case 2, and Proposition 2 implies that all feasible paths are implementable, in particular all feasible paths along which the current or expected future stock of public debt is stabilized, for all theoretically admissible values of the structural parameters.
37
So, in the context of these model, alternative tax instruments, and observation set, a tax authority can always conduct a tax policy that stabilizes the current or expected future stock of public debt in equilibrium without generating local-equilibrium multiplicity, in particular even in the presence of observation or policy-implementation lags of any length, i.e. for any ( , d) ∈ N 2 . This result implies that Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe's (1997) finding should be interpreted not as an argument against debtstabilizing (labor-)income-tax policy per se, but instead as an argument against one specific (though natural) way of implementing this policy: one that achieves the policy's goal not only in, but also out of equilibrium. 38 Debt-stabilizing tax policy may well inherently amplify business cycles, as recalled by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997). But, at least in the context of their model, their alternative tax instruments, and this observation set, and as long as it is not required to achieve its goal also out of equilibrium, this policy does not inherently generate local-equilibrium multiplicity. 35 This model amounts to the one detailed in the appendix of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe's (1997) paper, augmented with policy-implementation lags and technology and government-purchases disturbances following stationary fundamental ARMA processes. They use this model with lags but without disturbances at the end of Section 3, and with stationary AR(1) disturbances but without lags in Section 4. 36 The results would be identical if T A were instead assumed to observe the capital stock or not to observe the governmentpurchases shock, i.e. for Ot = {Y t− , τ t−1 , ε g,t− }, Ot = {y t− , x t− , h t− , c t− , u t− , w t− , τ t−1 }, or Ot = {Y t− , τ t−1 }. 37 It is easy to check that all feasible paths remain implementable when some additional exogenous disturbances (like consumption-utility or labor-disutility disturbances) are introduced into the model. 38 The tax-rate rules considered by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) may involve, for instance, yt and gt (for the income-tax-rate rule stabilizing the current stock of public debt when d = 0), or yt, gt, ut, b t−1 , (Et{y t+k }) 1≤k≤d , (Et{u t+k }) 1≤k≤d , and (Et{τ t+k }) 1≤k≤d (for the income-tax-rate rule stabilizing the expected future stock of public debt when d ≥ 1), where b t−1 denotes the stock of public debt at date t − 1.
Discussion
In this section, I make three sets of additional remarks about the general results obtained in Section 3.
First, I highlight the methodological contribution of the paper, namely the arithmetic design of policyinstrument rules. Second, I show the absence of direct relationship between the issues of feasible-path implementability and exogenous-shock identifiability. Third, I briefly discuss the extension of the results to models with several policy instruments.
Arithmetic Design of Policy-Instrument Rules
On the methodological front, for each observation set and implementable path, conditionally on a given known number of roots of D J (X) outside the unit circle, I show in Appendix A.3 how to design arithmetically, i.e. with a finite number of arithmetic operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division), a policy-instrument rule that is consistent with this observation set and implements that path as the robustly unique local equilibrium. 39 This method of designing policy-instrument rules does not require, in particular, the determination of any polynomial roots (except trivially roots of polynomials of degree one). Instead, it uses Bézout's identity, the Euclidean division, and Cramer's rule, all of which involve a finite number of arithmetic operations, to directly transform the polynomials A(X), B(X), C(X), D(X), E(X), S(X) and T(X) characterizing the structural equations, the exogenous disturbances, and the implementable path considered into the polynomials F(X), G(X), and H(X) characterizing the policy-instrument rule.
This conditional arithmetic-designability property implies that, for each model, policy instrument, observation set, and implementable path, the coefficients of the corresponding policy-instrument rule can be explicitly expressed as rational functions of the structural and implementable-path parameters, i.e.
as fractions of polynomial functions of these parameters, in any given region of the structural-parameter space within which the number of roots of D J (X) outside the unit circle is constant. Of course, unless the specific model and implementable path considered are particularly simple, these rational functions will involve, by most standards, an unusually large number of terms in the numerator and the denominator.
However, their analytical manipulation with a symbolic-computation software should raise no practical difficulty. For instance, their derivatives could be easily computed to determine how the coefficients of the policy-instrument rule respond to an arbitrarily small change in the value of the structural or implementable-path parameters.
Moreover, in some cases, the number of roots of D J (X) outside the unit circle can easily be shown to be constant over the whole structural-parameter space, so that the coefficients of the policy-instrument rule mentioned in the previous paragraph can be globally (instead of locally) expressed as rational functions of the structural and implementable-path parameters. Consider, for instance, a typical medium-scale DSGE model of the monetary transmission mechanism, such as Smets and Wouters' (2007), with the interest rate as the policy instrument. Its structural equations and exogenous disturbances can easily be written in a form of type (1) and (2) with N = 13 and M = 6 (ignoring the monetary-policy disturbance)
that satisfies Assumptions 1 to 5 for all theoretically admissible values of its structural parameters, except a set of values of measure zero. 40 Suppose that the central bank observes (possibly with lags) all the endogenous variables set by the private sector, i.e. J = {1, ..., N }. 41 The roots of D {1,...,N } (X), if any, are the solutions in X of the system made of the equations ∆ j (X) = 0 for j ∈ {1, ..., N + 1}. This system is non-linear in the unknown X, but linear in the D ≡ max{d ∆j |j ∈ {1, ..., N + 1}} unknowns X d for d ∈ {1, ..., D}. It is easy to check analytically that this linear system has no solution, as D < N + 1, and therefore that D {1,...,N } (X) has no root, and in particular no root outside the unit circle, for all theoretically admissible values of the structural parameters (except possibly a set of values of measure zero).
Feasible-Path Implementability and Exogenous-Shock Identifiability
It might be thought at first sight that the issue of feasible-path implementability that I raise and study in this paper could be related to the well known issue of exogenous-shock identifiability first raised by Sargent (1981, 1991) . Sargent (1981, 1991) provide concrete examples of dynamic stochastic rational-expectations models whose exogenous shocks cannot be identified by an econometrician because they are not fundamental for the observed variables on the equilibrium path, i.e.
they do not belong to the space spanned by square-summable linear combinations of current and past observed variables on the equilibrium path. Similarly, when O t = {Y t , i t−1 } for instance, if ε t is not fundamental for Y t − and therefore cannot be recovered from Y t − on a given feasible path, and if i t depends on ε t on this path, then isn't this path necessarily non-implementable, on the ground that the policy maker's only original source of information about ε t is Y t ?
The answer is no. For instance, in the context of Subsection 4.1's model and observation set, the shocks ε η t and ε u t happen to be non-fundamental for the variables c t , π t , y t , n t , and w t on the timeless-perspective optimal feasible path for the whole grid of values of ρ and θ that I consider under both calibrations. Yet, this path is implementable for many values of ρ and θ, as shown in Figure 1 . So non-fundamentalness of the unobserved shocks for the observed variables on a given feasible path is not a sufficient condition for the non-implementability of this path.
Neither is it a necessary condition for that matter. For instance, in the context of Subsection 2.5's model and observation set, consider, for any (θ, φ) ∈ R * ×R, the path [
, which satisfies (5). This path is feasible, since i t can be expressed on this path as a function of only elements of the policy maker's observation set:
It is straightforward to write the system made of (5) and the latter equation in Blanchard and Kahn's
that the eigenvalues of the 3 × 3 matrix M are 0 and the two roots of Q(X), which do not depend on φ.
Therefore, as follows from Subsection 2.5's analysis, the feasible path considered may be implementable or non-implementable whether ε t is fundamental or not for y t on this path, i.e. whether |φ| < |θ| or |φ| ≥ |θ|. The only consequence of ε t being non-fundamental for y t on this path (i.e. |φ| ≥ |θ|) is that all the policy-instrument rules consistent with the policy maker's observation set and this path are then "superinertial," in the sense that the polynomial in L characterizing the i t term in each of these rules 40 This set of values of measure zero is the set characterized by (1 − c 1 )[z 1 zy − αφpz 1 − (1 − α)φp] + c 2 cy = 0, where c 1 , c 2 , cy, z 1 , zy, α, and φp are reduced-form parameters. I do not require Assumption 6 to be met because (i) this assumption is used only as a sufficient condition for D J (X) to have at most n a roots outside the unit circle, and (ii) as I will show, in the context of these model, policy instrument, and observation set, D J (X) always has no root outside the unit circle. 41 In this model, the endogenous variables set by the private sector are the output level, the consumption level, the investment flow, the installed capital stock, the capital utilization rate, the utilized capital stock, the rental rate on capital, the capital-stock value, hours worked, the real wage, the wage mark-up, the inflation rate, and the price mark-up.
has at least one root inside the unit circle (namely, the root −θφ −1 ). 42 However, as is well known since Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Woodford (1999a) , superinertial policy-instrument rules may very well ensure (robust) local-equilibrium determinacy.
Extension to Models With Several Policy Intruments
Throughout the paper, I have focused on models with a single policy instrument. However, some of the results obtained can easily be extended to models with several policy instruments. Indeed, in such models, one can (i) set all the policy instruments, except one, according to their expressions in the VARMA specification of the feasible path considered, (ii) treat these policy-instrument rules in the same way as structural equations (if they involve some endogenous variables) or exogenous disturbances (if they do not), and (iii) apply Proposition 1 or 2 to the remaining policy instrument. As an illustration, in a previous version of this paper (Loisel, 2013) , I proceed this way to establish, in one of the models considered by Correia, Farhi, Nicolini, and Teles (2013), the implementability of optimal unconventional fiscal policy with two tax instruments when the interest rate is at the zero lower bound.
Conclusion
Overall, one important message of the paper is that the policy maker's observation set is a key feature of the environment that should be explicitly stated alongside other features such as preferences, technologies, and markets. Not only do the set of feasible paths and its subset of implementable paths depend on this observation set, but they do so in partly unrelated ways (as a change in the observation set may affect either both of them, or only the former, or only the latter, or none of them). Given the nontrivial nature of these links, the first main contribution of the paper has been to characterize − at least partially − the subset of implementable paths, within the set of feasible paths, for various alternative observation sets of the policy maker, in a broad class of models that includes many, if not most of the models currently used for macroeconomic-stabilization-policy analysis. As a side methodological result, the paper has also shown, for each observation set and implementable path, how to design arithmetically a policy-instrument rule that is consistent with this observation set and implements that path as the robustly unique local equilibrium, so that the coefficients of this rule can be explicitly expressed as rational functions of the structural and implementable-path parameters.
These general results can be readily applied to many different models, policy instruments, observation sets, and feasible paths. The second main contribution of the paper has precisely been to apply them to two specific contexts, concerning two different stabilization policies in two different textbook models.
The first application has shown that optimal feasible monetary policy may not be implementable in the basic New Keynesian model for reasonable observation sets of the central bank. One implication of this result is that central banks should make a cautious use of the key unobserved rates of interest that the New Keynesian literature recommends them to track. Another one is that normative analyses of stabilization policy should consider as a benchmark not only the optimal feasible path, but also the optimal implementable path or some proxy for the latter path. 43 The second application has shown that, 42 The term "superinertial" was coined by Woodford (1999a) . 43 The optimal implementable path can typically not be determined when it does not coincide with the optimal feasible path, because its determination then requires to optimize over a set of policy-instrument rules with a finite but unbounded number of coefficients and an unbounded range of values for each coefficient, subject to the robust-local-equilibriumdeterminacy constraint. A proxy for this path can then be obtained by focusing on rules with a large but bounded number contrary to conventional wisdom, debt-stabilizing feasible tax policy is implementable in the standard RBC model for reasonable observation sets of the tax authority. In so doing, it has illustrated the fact that focusing on specific parametric families of policy-instrument rules may provide a misleading picture of the implementability of a given feasible path. These two applications are, of course, specific in many ways, but the door is left open to a wide range of other applications.
Appendix
In this appendix, I prove Lemmas 1 and 2 and Propositions 1 and 4, and I study the robustness of Subsection 4.1's non-implementability result.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider a system of structural equations of type (1) and a rule of type (3) satisfying (13) . Note them, respectively, S and R (with the understanding that any operator applied to the system S or the rule R is applied to both the left-and right-hand sides of this system or rule). I proceed in two steps: first, I
show that the system made of S and R can be written in Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) form with n a non-predetermined variables; second, I show that its non-zero eigenvalues are the non-zero roots of (14).
Step 1: for each j ∈ S B , replace sequentially, for k = 0, ..., n b j + n a , the term E t {i t+n b j −k } (if it appears) in u j S by its expression in E t {L k−n b j R}. Let S denote the resulting system, and let ( n a j ) 1≤j≤N and A(X) denote the counterparts of (n a j ) 1≤j≤N and A(X) for S. Note that A(0) = A(0), since R satisfies (13) . The rest of Step 1 is essentially devoted to the rewriting of S. For simplicity, I will keep the same notations S, ( n a j ) 1≤j≤N , and A(X) throughout the rewriting process. The operation conducted at the beginning of Step 1 ensures that none of the rewritten systems S will include any term of type E t {i t+k } with k ∈ N. 
This operation makes the first j 1 lines of A(0) identical to the first j 1 lines of I N . If K = 1, then the system made of S and R, which is equivalent to the system made of S and R, can easily be written −k } (if it appears) in u j S by its expression in
This operation does not affect the first j 1 lines of A(0), and ensures in particular that for each i ∈ {j 1 + 1, ..., j 2 }, (i) S does not include any term of type E t {u i Y t+k } with n a j2 < k < n a j1 , and (ii) u j1+1 S, of coefficients and a large but bounded range of values for each coefficient.
..., u j2 S are the only lines of S in which E t {u i Y t+ n a j 2 } may appear. Proceed in a similar way as previously to transform u j S for j ∈ {j 1 + 1, ..., j 2 }, then (if K ≥ 3) u j S for j ∈ {j 2 + 1, ..., j 3 }, and so on up to
}, and (ii) this term appears only in the line u i S and its coefficient is one (as A(0) = I N ). The system made of S and R, which is equivalent to the system made of S and R, can then easily be written in Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) form with
Step 2:
, with Φ(0) = 0. Now, the non-zero eigenvalues of the system made of S and R are those of the corresponding perfect-foresight
where, for any statement s, 1 s ≡ 1 if s is true and 1 s ≡ 0 if s is wrong. Given that R satisfies (13) , and by construction of the polynomials K j (X) for j ∈ S B , I get that Ω(X) is a polynomial, i.e.
with
. (14) up to a multiplicative factor of type X z with z ∈ Z. Therefore, the non-zero roots of |X d Ω Ψ(X −1 )| are those of (14) . Lemma 1 follows.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the policy-instrument rule i t = H(L)ε t , where H(X) is an arbitrary element of R[X]. This rule is of type (3) with F(X) = 0 and G(X) = 1, and satisfies (13) . Therefore, Lemma 1 implies that (i) the system made of (1) and this rule can be written in Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) form with n a non-predetermined variables, and (ii) the non-zero eigenvalues of this system are (and have the same multiplicity as) the non-zero roots of (14), i.e. the non-zero roots of ∆ N +1 (X). Now, given Assumption 6, this system has at least one stationary solution for (Y t ) t∈Z . Therefore, Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) order condition implies that ∆ N +1 (X) has at most n a roots outside the unit circle (taking into account their multiplicity), and hence so does D J (X) for any set J ⊆ {1, ..., N }. Lemma 2 follows.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a given set J such that J * ⊆ J ⊆ {1, ..., N } and a given ( Y , ε ) ∈ N 2 such that ε ≤ Y .
Consider also a given feasible path for O t = {u j Y t− Y , i t−1 , ε t− ε |j ∈ J }, note it P , and write it as (4).
I proceed in two steps: first, I design some F(X) satisfying (10) and (11) and some G(X) such that, whatever H(X), the system made of the structural equations (1) and the corresponding rule (3) has a unique stationary solution (even when an exogenous policy shock is added to this rule); second, I design H(X) satisfying (12) such that this solution is P .
Step 1: Bézout's identity implies that there exists (
exactly n a roots outside the unit circle (taking into account their multiplicity), and (ii) Θ(X) is a divisor of Z(X)D J (X). The existence of Z(X) is a consequence of (i) Assumptions 4 and 5, which imply that ∀j ∈ {1, ..., N + 1}, ∆ j (X) = 0, and therefore that D J (X) = 0, (ii) Lemma 2, which states that
has at most n a roots outside the unit circle, and (iii) the restriction to local paths, which requires that all the roots of Θ(X) lie inside the unit circle. Let m ∈ N be such that
Finally, given that ∆ N +1 (X) = 0, let Q(X) ∈ R[X] and R(X) ∈ R[X] denote respectively the quotient and the remainder of the Euclidean division of X m Z(X) by ∆ N +1 (X), i.e. the unique polynomials such
Multiplying the left-and right-hand sides
is admissible since it implies that
is admissible too since it implies that F(X) satisfies (10) and (11) . Finally, this choice is such that F(X) also satisfies (13) . Lemma 1 then implies that any rule of type (3) with these F(X) and G(X) is such that (i) the system made of the structural equations (1) and this rule can be written in Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) form with n a nonpredetermined variables, and (ii) the non-zero eigenvalues of this system are the non-zero roots of (14) and hence, given (A.2), the non-zero roots of
has exactly n a roots outside the unit circle (taking into account their multiplicity). Therefore, the system made of the structural equations (1) and any rule of type (3) with these F(X) and G(X) meets Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) order condition. Moreover, except possibly for a zero-measure subset of the set of admissible polynomials (U j (X)) j∈J ∪{N +1} and Z(X), this system meets Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) rank condition too, given the assumption J * ⊆ J .
As a consequence, this sytem has a unique stationary solution for (Y t , i t ) t∈Z , even when an exogenous policy shock is added to the rule.
Step 2: consider first the case in which max{n b j − n a j |j ∈ S B } < 0. There exists a unique power series
k , whose coefficients Ξ k are 1 × M matrices with real-number elements, such that, along the path P ,
where F(X) and G(X) are the polynomials designed in Step 1. If ε ≥ 1, then this series is such that (12), and it is an admissible choice if and only if the number of non-zero coefficients Ξ k is finite, i.e. if and only if the power series
. Let me now show that the latter condition is met. There
Since, as a scalar polynomial, |D(X)| is such that |D(X)|K = K|D(X)| for any matrix K, multiplying the left-and right-hand sides of (A.4) by |D(L)| leads to
where E(X) is the unique element of R M ×M [X] such that (2) can be equivalently rewritten as |D(L)|ξ t = E(L)ε t . The system made of (A.3) and (A.5) is of type with m j ≥ d ∆j for j ∈ {1, ..., N + 1} such that this system can be rewritten as
given Step 1. But Cramer's rule also implies that there exists Υ(X) ∈ R (N +1)×M [X] such that the path
by construction of Z (X). Given Assumption 5, the identification of (A.6) with (A.7) shows that Ξ(X) ∈ R 1×M [X], so that the choice of H(X) ≡ Ξ(X) is admissible. In the alternative case in which max{n b j − n a j |j ∈ S B } ≥ 0, an admissible H(X) can be designed in a similar way by using the fact that the F(X) designed in Step 1 satisfies (13) . Therefore, the rule of type (3) with the F(X), G(X), and H(X) designed in Steps 1 and 2 satisfies (10), (11) , and (12), and is such that (i) the system made of (1) and this rule has a unique stationary solution (even when an exogenous policy shock is added to this rule), and (ii) the path P is one stationary solution of this system. Proposition 1 follows.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Assume that ρ u = µ. Given that the timeless-perspective optimal feasible path is defined as the limit of the date-t 0 Ramsey-optimal feasible path as t 0 → −∞, I proceed in four steps: in the first step, I write the optimization problem that defines the date-t 0 Ramsey-optimal feasible path when O t = {ε η,t−1 , ε u,t−1 };
in the second and third steps, I solve this problem and determine the date-t 0 Ramsey-optimal feasible path when O t = {ε η,t−1 , ε u,t−1 }; in the fourth step, I deduce from the latter path the timeless-perspective optimal feasible path when O t = {ε η,t−1 , ε u,t−1 }, show that it can be written as (24) , conclude that it is also the timeless-perspective optimal feasible path when O t = {c t−1 , π t−1 , y t−1 , n t−1 , w t−1 , i t−1 }, and finally show that the last line of (24) is a canonical rule for this path.
Step 1: the date-t 0 Ramsey-optimal feasible path is defined as the state-contingent path for the endogenous variables that minimizes the welfare loss function at date t 0 subject to the structural equations and CB's observation-set constraint. To determine this path when O t = {ε η,t−1 , ε u,t−1 }, I follow the undetermined-coefficients method and specify the inflation rate and the output level in the following general linear way: π t0+k = 
subject to the following constraints:
= 0 for k ≥ 0 and j ∈ {0, ..., k} , (A.9)
= 0 for k ≥ 1 and j ∈ {1, ..., k} , (A.12) 44 I do not consider a deterministic term c π k (respectively c y k ) in the expression of π t 0 +k (respectively y t 0 +k ) because this term is clearly zero on the date-t 0 Ramsey-optimal feasible path.
where σ ≡ γ(1 − s). These constraints are derived from (i) the structural equations (17), (18) , and (19) , (ii) the stochastic processes (22) and (23) , and (iii) the observation set O t considered, which implies that i t cannot depend on (ε Step 2: let me first focus on the determination of coefficients (a π j,k , a y j,k ) k≥0,0≤j≤k . The first-order conditions of the Lagrangian's minimization with respect to these coefficients are
where V η denotes the variance of ε η t . After some algebra to get rid of the Lagrange multipliers, I obtain that these first-order conditions amount to the following conditions on coefficients (a Step 4: the coefficients (a . . .
Since R d+1 = R 1 (P d − 
A.5 Robustness of Subsection 4.1's Non-Implementability Result
Suppose that the economy is also hit by three additional disturbances, a government-purchases disturbance g t , a productivity disturbance a t , and a consumption-utility or labor-disutility disturbance ν t , so that the Euler equation (17) is left unchanged and the other structural equations (18) to (21) become respectively π t = βE t {π t+1 } + κ(y t − φ g g t − φ a a t − φ ν ν t ) + u t , (A.31) Now, a canonical rule for this path can be obtained as follows: (i) add, to the right-hand side of the last line of (24) , an exogenous term involving ε g,t−1 , ε a,t−1 , and ε ν,t−1 , such that the resulting equation is satisfied on this path; (ii) multiply both the left-and the right-hand sides of the latter equation
by the divisor of (1 − µL)θ a (L)θ ν (L) of minimal degree for the resulting equation to involve ε g,t−1 , ε a,t−1 , and ε ν,t−1 only through a finite number of terms of type g t−k , a t−k , ν t−k , ε (24) does, because all the operations used to transform the latter into the former (addition of an exogenous term; multiplication by a polynomial in L whose roots lie all outside the unit circle; addition of linear combinations, whose coefficients are polynomials in L, of the structural equations) are neutral for robust local-equilibrium determinacy. Therefore, the timelessperspective optimal feasible path is implementable in the presence of the three additional disturbances g t , a t , and ν t for exactly the same values of the structural parameters as in their absence. In particular, Figure 1 is still valid in the presence of these additional disturbances.
